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Labour and the "Real” constitution* 
Harry W. ARTHURS** 
While Canadass formal constitution does not meniion labour or 
employmett law, and while jurisprudence has long estabiished the primacy 
of provincial jurisdiciion in this field, labour's constitutional rights have 
been the subject of extensive recent litigation and scholarship. This article 
reviews attempss to use the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms to protect labour's interesss and to advance the cause of 
equality in the workplace. It then explores how Canadass constitutional 
architecture has tended to frustrate the interesss of unions and workers. 
And finally, it proposes that labour's interesss will largely be determined 
not by the formal constitution but by the “real constitution" — the struc-
ture of its economy. While the “real constitution " generally diifavours 
labour's rights and interests, like the formal constitution it is vague and 
leaves ample room for challenge and for change. 
Même si la constitution officielle du Canada ne fait aucunement 
mention du droit du travall ou de l’emploi, et quoique la jurisprudence 
ait depuis longtemps établi la prépondérance de la compétenee provin-
ciale dans ce domaine, les droits constitutionnels des syndicass et des 
travailleurs ont récemment fait l’objet de nombreux litiges et d’un examen 
approfondi dans la doctrine. Cet article passe en revue les tentaiives de 
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se servir des dispositions de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés 
afin de protéger les intérêts des syndicass et des travallleuss et de faire 
progresser la cause de l’égalité en milieu de travail. Il explore ensuite la 
manière dont Varchitecture constitutionnelle du Canada a eu tendance 
à contrecarrer les intérêts des syndicass et des travailleurs. En dernier 
lieu, il suggère que les intérêts des syndicass et des travallleuss seront 
tranchés en grande partie non pas par la constitution officielle mais bien 
par la « véritable constitution », soit la structure de son économie. Bien 
que la « véritable constitution » soit généralement défavorabee aux droits 
et intérêts des syndicass et des travallleurs, à l’instar de la constitution 
officielle, elle est vague et laisse ample place à l’évolution et pour faire 
valoir des oopositions. 
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Labour and Social Rights under Canada’s “Real Constitution” 61 
The word “labour” does not appear in the Canadian constitution, nor 
do the words “worker”, “trade union”, “strike” or “picketing”. This seems 
odd. After all, the constitution concerns itself with matters great (“peace 
order and good government”) and small (“beacons, buoys and ... auctioneer 
1 
2 
3 
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... licenses”)1. Its text not only invokes the sublime principles (“the rule of 
law ... a free and democratic society ... principles of fundamental justice”) 
which bridge the deep fault lines of society (“race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex or...disability”)2 but also prompts almost Proustian 
recall of the other factors of production (“sea coast and inland fisheries ... 
patents of invention and discovery ... bills of exchange and promissory 
notes... ships, railways, canals, telegraph ... heavy crude oil ... sawdust 
wood pulp”)3. However, “labour” appears only when it ceases to 
labour when it is pensioned off or becomes “unemployed”4. 
I have noted elsewhere the recent disappearance of “labour” as an 
industrial power, a political force, a socio-cultural category and a depart-
ment of public administration5. Paradoxically, however, although Canada’s 
fundamental law dares not speak its name, labour has not disappeared from 
Canadian constitutional discourse. To the contrary, labour’s constitutional 
rights have been the subject of extensive recent litigation and scholarship. 
In this article, I will first review attempts to use the provisions of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to protect labour’s collec-
tive interests and to advance the cause of equality in the workplace and, 
more generally, in society. Next, I will explain how the architecture of the 
Canadian constitution has tended to frustrate the interests of unions and 
workers. And finally, I will suggest that what I call Canada’s “real constitu-
tion” largely determines labour rights and interests. 
1 Labour and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1.1 Background 
The Canadian Charter of Righss and Freedoms was adopted in 
19826. While some progressive academics and union lawyers hoped that 
the Charter might serve as a vehicle to promote shared consciousness 
1. Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict.,c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, 
s. 91 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867]. 
2. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, Preamble 
ss. 1, 7, 15 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982]. 
3. Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91, 92A. 
4. Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 94A, 91(2A). 
5. H.W. ARTHURS, What Immortal Hand or Eye ? - Who Will Redraw the Boundaries 
of Labour Law ; , in G. DAVIDOV & B. LANGILLE (eds.), Boundaries and Frontiers of 
Labour Law : Goals and Means in the Regulaiion of Work, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2006. 
6. Constitution Act, 1982, Part I. 
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amongst Canadian workers7, the trade union movement itself notably failed 
to argue for the entrenchment of labour rights in the Charter. There are 
many possible reasons why it failed to do so : Québec unions and those in 
the rest of Canada differed over entrenchment of the Charter ; unions in 
general were preoccupied with their ongoing struggles against employers 
and Prime Minister Trudeau, the Charter’s principal architect ; they failed to 
perceive the potential importance of the Charter ; they were concerned that 
if they sought to entrench labour rights, business would seek to entrench 
property rights, thereby hobbling the state’s regulatory powers ; and finally, 
they almost certainly believed for good historical reasons that even if 
labour and social rights were entrenched judges were unlikely to interpret 
them sympathetically8 
These are all plausible explanations. However, whichever was the 
true one, the crucial fact is that labour made no attempt to ensure that 
the Charter protected workers’ rights to unionize, to assert their collec-
tive power or to be sheltered from insecurity and want. Thus, labour and 
social rights did not find their way into the Charter, except for so-called 
mobility rights—the right to move to and pursue a livelihood in any prov-
ince9—and a vague promise that Canadians in all parts of the country 
would enjoy reasonably equal access to public goods and services10. It is 
worth noting, however, that mobility rights and equalization programs also 
benefit employers, and ultimately serve more to promote federalism than 
they do to protect workers. 
That said, even though labour and social rights were not entrenched, 
other more generic rights were. These generic rights included freedom of 
peaceful assembly, association and expression11—all potentially impor-
tant to labour—and the right “not to be deprived of life, liberty and security 
of the person ... except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice...”12 which on its face offers workers no more or less protection 
7. D.M. BeaTTY, Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutionll Labour Code, 
Kingston and Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987 ; T.S. KUTTNER, “Consti-
tution as Covenant: Labour Law, Labour Boards and the Courts from the Old to the 
New Dispensation”, (1988) 13 Queen's L.J. 32. 
8. B. Perry, “The Role of Popular Mobilizations in the Struggle for the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms”, (1994) 22 Crime, Law and Social Change 192-194; J.M. weILer , 
“The Regulation of Strikes and Picketing Under the Charter...”, in R.M. ELLIOT and 
J.M. W E I L E r (eds.), Litigaiing the Values of a Naiion : The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedom,, Toronto, Carswell, 1986, p. 212-213. 
9. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom,, 1982, section 6. 
10. Id., Part IJJ. 
11. Id., Section 2. 
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than anyone else in trouble with the law. However, significant numbers of 
workers were clearly intended to benefit from Charter provisions which 
guaranteed equality “before and under the law ... without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability”13. By judicial interpretation, the protection of this 
section has been extended to “similarly situated” or “analogous” groups 
such as gays and lesbians14. 
For better or worse, neither the working class nor poor people have 
been identified as an “analogous group” entitled to protection; nor are 
they likely to be15. Consequently, any legal gains the Charter has brought 
to workers or poor people have accrued to them as women, people of 
colour, disabled people, gays, aboriginal peoples and so on. Moreover, 
since the Charter was enacted, social and political mobilization occurs 
with increasing frequency around these Charter categories, rather than by 
virtue of “labour” or “working class” solidarity. While no doubt mobiliza-
tion around Charter identities has led to some improved legal rights and 
social benefits for members of these groups, even in an era of neo-liber-
alism, one unintended consequence has been to distract attention from, 
if not actually to hasten, the disappearance of “labour” in all the senses 
mentioned above. 
In succeeding sections, I explore the effects of the Charter on labour 
in its collective or solidaristic sense, on equality seeking groups and on 
social rights. 
1.2 Collective labour law 
The Supreme Court of Canada in the mid-1980s decided a trilogy 
of cases arising out of workers’ claims that by guaranteeing freedom of 
expression and association, the Charter had actually entrenched the right 
of workers to organize, strike and picket16. That first trilogy ended with 
13. Id., Section 15. 
14. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R 143. 
15. M. JaCkMAN, Constitutional Contact with the Disparities in the World: Poverty as a 
Prohibited Ground of Discrimination under the Canadian Charter and Human Rights 
Law”, (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Stud. 76. 
16. The Supreme Court’s first “labour trilogy” comprised: Referenee re Public Service 
Employee Relations Act (Alta.j, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter PSERA] ;Retail, Whole-
sale and Department Store Union, v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 [hereinafter 
RWDSU v. Saskatchewan] ; Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 424 [hereinafter PSAC.. In each of these cases the Supreme Court declined to 
use the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to protect the right of workers to 
bargain collectively or to strike. The literature criticizing the trilogy is extensive. See 
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the score of management three, labour nil. However, a dozen years later the 
Court decided a second labour rights trilogy extending Charter protection 
of freedom of association to agricultural workers, characterizing picketing 
as free speech, and upholding a statute designed to reduce labour conflict 
by requiring workers to join a union—a prima facie violation of their 
freedom of association17. This time ‘round the scoreboard read labour 
three, management nil. Or so it appeared. However, appearances deceive. 
On closer examination, in its decisions in this second trilogy, the Supreme 
Court merely instructed legislatures to carefully balance labour’s Charter 
rights against economic exigency, public safety and private rights of prop-
erty person and reputation. If legislatures can offer a reasonable justifica-
tion said the Court legislation restricting labour rights will be upheld18. 
Many judgments in these two labour trilogies contain passionate state-
ments about how work defines our status and sense of self-worth ; about 
the virtues of an open society ; about the need of the powerless to be 
able to band together for mutual support against powerful governments 
and employers : all admirable sentiments for those who believe in labour 
rights19. And the judgments denying or limiting labour’s constitutional 
rights are no less engaging. One judge, for example, analogized picketing 
to playing golf : neither activity, he said, is illegal just because it involves 
concerted action; but neither is constitutionally protected20. Another 
e.g. D. B e a t T Y & S. KENNETT, “Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest and Poli-
tical Participation in Free and Democratic Societies”, (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 573 ; J. 
KILCOYNE, “Developments in Employment Law : the 1986-87 term”, (1988) 10 S.C. Law 
Rev. 183 ; P. WEILER, “The Charter at Work: Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of 
Labour and Employment Law”, (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 1ll; B. ETHERINGTON, “An Asses-
sment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws under the Charter: Of Realists, Romantics, 
and Pragmatists”, (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 685. 
17. The Supreme Court’s second “labour trilogy” comprised : Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney 
General), (2001) 207 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Dunmore] (total exclusion of 
agricultural workers from collective bargaining struck down); Retail, Wholesaee and 
Department Store Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd,, (2002) 
208 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Pepsi-Cola] (common law prohibition of secondary 
picketing as illegal per se struck down) ; R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd,, (2001) 205 
D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Advance Cuttingg & Coring] (Québec legislation requiring 
union membership for all construction workers upheld). 
18. Dunmore, supra, note 17, para. 49; Pepsi-Cola, supra, note 17, para. 107; Advance 
Cutting & Coring, supra, note 17, para. 267. 
19. PSERA, supra, note 16, para. 95; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, supra, note 16, para. 69; 
PSAC, supra, note 16, para. 48 ; Dunmore, supra, note 17, para. 115 ; Pepsi-Cola, supra, 
note 17, para. 33 ; Advance Cutting & Coring, supra, note 17, para. 16. 
20. McIntyre J. in PSERA, supra, note 16, para. 176. See also H.W. ARTHURS, “The Right 
to Golf: Reflections on the Future of Workers, Unions and the Rest of Us Under the 
Charter”, (1988) 13 Queen's L.J. 17. 
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judge, having unequivocally affirmed the freedom of downtrodden agricul-
tural workers to associate, suddenly turned Delphic : “I neither require nor 
forbid the inclusion of agricultural workers in a full collective bargaining 
regime,” he said21. Ontario’s then-Conservative government, whose with-
drawal of the right of these workers to unionize had provoked the litigation, 
interpreted the oracle’s message in accordance with its own inclinations. 
It enacted the Agricultural Employees Proteciion Act severely punishing 
any interference with the right of farm workers to associate—but forbid-
ding them to bargain collectively or to strike22. A third judge imaginatively 
invoked the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression to overturn 
earlier lower court decisions which had held all secondary picketing to be 
illegal per se. However, she then remarked that “of course” such picketing 
would still be illegal if it amounted to “tortious or criminal conduct”23. 
Since over the years virtually all picket line conduct has been held to be 
criminal or tortious24, the practical consequences of her original holding 
are, to say the least, modest. 
At least on the basis of the record to date, then, Canadian workers 
have no reason to be optimistic about using the Charter to protect their 
collective rights. 
1.3 Equality in the workplace 
The equality provisions of the Charter have been repeatedly invoked 
over the past twenty years to force governments and employers to address 
issues of workplace discrimination especially against women25 and against 
gays and lesbians, who have been deemed an “analogous group” entitled to 
Charter protection26. In some cases the Charter has been used in litigation 
21. Bastarache J. in Dunmore, supra, note 17, para. 68. 
22. Agricultural Employees Proteciion Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 16. 
15. McLachlin C.J. in Pepsi-Cola, supra, note 17, para. 66. 
24. See e.g. H.W. ARTHURS, Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada: Some Problems of Judi-
cial Workmanship , (1960) 38 Can. Bar Rev. 346; A.W.R. CarROTHERS & E.E. FALMER, 
Report of a study on the labour injunction in Ontario, Toronto, Ontario Dept. of Labour, 
1966; I.M. ChRISTIE, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort: a Comparative Study 
of the Law in England and Canada, Kingston, Quœn s University, Industrial Relations 
Centre, 1967; S.A. IACON, Tort liability in a colleciive bargaining regime, T oronto, 
Butterworths, 1980. 
25. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 
3 S.C.R. 3 ; 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1 ; Service Employees Internaiionll Union, Local 204 v. 
Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 508 (Gen. Div.). 
26. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
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to force governments to enlarge the coverage of human rights legislation27. 
For the most part, however, Charter rhetoric has been used to rally public 
support for legislation designed to force employers to eliminate overt work-
place discrimination, to prevent harassment, to provide equivalent bene-
fits for workers of all backgrounds and persuasions, and even to modify 
workplace arrangements to accommodate disabled people and people with 
non-standard religious customs. But the role of the Charter should not be 
over-estimated. Social, economic and political mobilization by advocacy 
groups has been much more effective than legislation in advancing equality 
in the workplace as have the changing demography of the workforce inter-
generational shifts in social values and episodic interventions by human 
rights agencies28 
Indeed, even when Charter and human rights litigation has clarified 
and expanded the equality rights of various groups of workers, their actual 
experience of discrimination at work has often not changed much29. For 
example, the wage gap between men and women has been narrowed a 
little—but very little; and the wage gap between recent immigrants and 
other workers has actually grown. There are more women and minority 
group members in managerial positions ; but the percentages are still deri-
sory. Unemployment rates for aboriginal peoples, new immigrants and 
workers of colour remain higher than those for white workers. And disabled 
people continue to suffer discrimination in many workplaces, despite the 
constitutional and statutory duty of employers not only to forbear from 
discriminating against them but to accommodate their special needs so that 
they can lead full working lives30 
1.4 Social and economic rights 
The Charter makes no specific mention of social rights, except those 
accruing to minority language groups31 and, in somewhat looser language, 
27. See e.g. Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525; 
Vriend v. Alberta (1998), 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385 ; Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703. 
28. See generally W.A. BoGART, Consequences : The Impact of Law and its Complexity, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002. 
29. The evidence is reviewed in H.W. ARTHURS & B. ARNOLD, “Does the Charter Matter?”, 
(2005) 11 Review of Constitutional Studies 37. 
30. For example, the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s most recent report revealed that 
disability complaints comprised 55 of all new employment-related complaints, a higher 
percentage than any other ground of discrimination. ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMIS-
sion, Annual Report 2005-2006, Toronto, Government of Ontario, p. 46. 
31. Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 16-23. 
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to aboriginal peoples32. It is also silent on economic rights other than 
so-called mobility rights33 and those which are implicit in its equality 
provisions. 
Moreover, Canadian courts had—until recently—declined to inter-
pret general Charter language guaranteeing “security of the person” in such 
a way as to require the state to provide everyone with at least minimum 
standards of economic and social security34. While these court holdings 
were disappointing to advocates of constitutionally-protected social rights, 
they were not unreasonable, given that the phrase “security of the person” 
was found in a provision of the Charter dealing with the prevention of 
procedural abuses in criminal cases. However, the Supreme Court’s 2006 
decision in Chaoulii seems to signal a fundamental shift in interpretation35. 
In Chaoulii the Court held that similar language in the Québec Charter 
conferred on individuals the right to timely access to medical procedures 
under its public health care system : 
In the face of delays in treatment that cause psychological and physical suffering, 
the prohibition on private insurance jeopardizes the right to life, liberty and secu-
rity of the person of Canadians in an arbitrary manner, and is therefore not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice . 
By way of remedy, the Court required Québec either to provide timely 
public services or to amend its health care legislation to permit individuals 
to purchase insurance to cover the cost of securing services in the private 
sector. 
The Chaoulii decision has been widely, almost unanimously, criticized 
by legal scholars, as both juridically indefensible and politically inexcus-
able37. However, it does have one intriguing aspect. If “security of the 
32. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. 
33. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 6. 
34. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 7. See e.g. Gossein v. Québec (Attorney General), [2002] 
4 S.C.R. 429. 
35. Chaoulii v. Québec (Attorney General), [ZUUJJ 1 S.C.R. 791, para. 34. 
3/T 12 Ts-J i 5 3 
, : t o . . 4 O 
Health Care , in C M . FLOOD, IV. KOACh & L . SOÜLN (eds.), Access to L,are, Access to 
Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Heaitn Insurance in L,anaaa, Toronto, U mver-
sity of Toronto Press, /.(KID ; M. JaCkMAN, l ne Last Line of Defence for [which ? ] Citi-
zens : Accountability, Equauty, and the Right to Health in cnaoulli , (zwo) 44 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 349; A. FETTER, Wealthcare: The Poutics of cnarter Revisitea , in 
CM. FLOOD, K. KOACh &L. SOSSTN (eds.), Access to Care, Access to Justice: T tie Legal 
Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada, Toronto, U mversity of Toronto Press, 
2UU5. 
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person” is impaired by denial of timely access to medical assistance, is it 
not also arguably impaired by public policies which fail to provide “the 
person” with reasonable access to other forms of “security” such as food, 
shelter, education and opportunities for work ? Such a reading of the deci-
sion would be ironic, given that the holding has generally been excoriated 
as subverting the Canadian welfare state. However, it is most unlikely that 
Chaoulii can be or will be used to ground a new approach to social rights. 
It is too easily distinguished on its facts or confined by narrow interpreta-
tions ; and the potential political consequences would be too far-reaching. 
Nor would it be prudent for friends of the welfare state to attempt to use 
Chaoulii in this way : as the actual result of the case indicates social engi-
neering by judges is highly erratic at best. Nor would it be appropriate as 
a matter of democratic principle : Canadians voted against constitutional-
izing social and economic rights in 1991 when they resolutely rejected the 
Charlottetown Accord with its proposed “Social Charter”38 
1.5 Conclusion 
While the Charter has been credited (and blamed) for many develop-
ments in Canadian legal and political life, it cannot be said that it has been a 
major force in extending legal or social protection to working people either 
collectively or as individuals. Even its equality provisions, according to 
some observers, have contributed less to the improvement of the position 
of marginalized workers than have legislative initiatives and changes in 
social attitudes. 
2 Constitutional Architecture and Labour Rights 
The constitutional provisions with the greatest impact on labour, I 
believe, are not found in the Charter. Rather they deal with the architecture 
of the Canadian state and of its federal system. 
2.1 Constitutional Jurisdiction to Regulate Labour Standards 
and Collective Labour Action 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Canada’s highest courts held that labour 
standards and labour disputes were matters of “property and civil rights” 
and of “a merely local and private nature in the province” and therefore 
38. K. mCROBERTS & P. MONAHAN (eds.), The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, 
and the Future of Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993 ; R. JOHNSTON, 
A. BLAIS, E. GIDENGIl et al., The Challenge of Direct Democracy : the 1992 Canadian 
Referendum, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996. 
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subject to provincial—not federal—jurisdiction39. This characterization 
represents an impoverished and anachronistic view of employment relations 
as involving “merely private” arrangements and resting only on contractual 
(“civil”) rights. It forecloses the possibility that labour market regulation for 
public purposes—to enhance social protection, prevent conflict or promote 
economic growth—might have independent constitutional significance. 
And especially, by conceptually locating the employment relation “in the 
province” it flies in the face of contemporary economic realities : all but the 
smallest business enterprises are likely to have suppliers, customers and/or 
workers in more than one province and to operate across provincial and 
national boundaries on a daily basis ; Canadian workers and employers 
treat the labour market as national (and indeed are encouraged to do so 
by the mobility provisions of the Charter)40 ; and crucially, “local” labour 
market policies involving industrial relations, job creation, skills training 
and social insurance invariably have national effects41. In short, viewed 
from the perspective of social and economic policy-making in today’s 
highly integrated national and continental economy, these early constitu-
tional interpretations seem anachronistic and impractical. 
Nonetheless, it is now settled law that the provinces, not the federal 
government, will normally regulate labour markets. Only in the event of war 
or economic crisis42, and in a few economic sectors where the constitu-
tion specifically establishes the primacy of federal jurisdiction—banking, 
broadcasting and telecommunications, trans-border shipping and aeronau-
tics, nuclear energy and works declared to be “for the general advantage 
of Canada”—may the federal government enact labour legislation43. As a 
result, over 90 % of Canadian workers come under provincial jurisdiction, 
less than 10% under federal jurisdiction44. 
This distribution of constitutional powers has significant consequences 
for the content and administration of Canada’s labour policy and practice. 
It forecloses the development of national industrial, labour market and 
39. Toronto Electric Commsssioners v. Snide,, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5 (P.C.) [hereinafter 
Snider]. 
40. 13 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 6. 
41. 14 By way of example, Quebec sought to protect job opportunities for locally-based 
skilled construction workers by excluding Ontario workers. Ontario retaliated by enac-
ting a statute banning Quebec workers. See Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act (Construc-
tion Labour Mobility,, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 4 (repealed in June 2006). 
42. Snider, supra, note 39 ; Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373. 
43. P.W. HOGG, Constitutionll Law of Canada, 5th ed., vol. 1, Toronto, Carswell, 2006, at 
p. 21-12 to 21-15. 
44. Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey (Ottawa; Statistics Canada, 2005) available 
online at www.statcan.ca/English/sdds/5076.htm. 
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training strategies. It occasionally impedes the resolution of labour disputes 
which—the constitution notwithstanding—sometimes occur on a nation-
wide basis45. It helps to reinforce the strong atomistic tendencies of North 
American industrial relations systems, which generally favour plant—level 
rather than enterprise—or sectoral-level bargaining46. It diminishes the 
authority, and perhaps the influence, of the Canadian Labour Congress and 
has inhibited the formation of a national labour-based political alignment47. 
And while it permits Canada’s provinces to experiment with progressive 
labour legislation, it also tempts them to engage in regulatory competition 
in which they seek to attract investment by reducing labour standards or 
curbing union rights48. 
On the other hand, these effects are to some extent mitigated by the 
fact that Canadian policy-makers, employers, union leaders, workers and 
other citizens live in a nationwide discursive community and political 
culture, that provincial and federal labour statutes are generally cut from 
the same cloth (though not necessarily to the same pattern) and that the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the criminal code, provincial and federal 
labour legislation and even decisions of provincial common and civil law 
judges and of labour tribunals are all subject to the ultimate reviewing 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Finally, special mention must be made of Québec. From the beginning 
of Québec’s “quiet revolution” in 1960, the trade union movement associ-
ated itself closely with the “national project”—the assertion of Québec’s 
dignity, prosperity, functional autonomy and, some propose, legal sover-
eignty. At least until recently, Québec employers also tended to support the 
national project by cooperating in corporatist and statist initiatives, and by 
minimizing overt ideological conflicts with labour. As a result, Québec has 
been able both to enact some of Canada’s most advanced labour legislation 
and to maintain one of its highest tax rates and most generous social welfare 
systems. More recently, however, anti-tax and neo-liberal approaches have 
gained support in Québec, especially in the business community, and the 
45. F.R. sCOTt, “Federal Jurisdiction Over Labour Relations : A New Look” in F.R. sCOTT, 
Essays on the Constitution : Aspecss of Canadian Law and Politics, Toronto, University 
of Toronto Press, 1977. 
46. R.J. ADAMS, Industrial Relaiions under Liberal Democracy : North America in Compa-
rative Perspective, Columbia SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1995. 
47. K. mCROBERTS, “Federal Structures and the Policy Process”, in M.M. ATKINSON, Gover-
ning Canada : Instituiions and Public Policy, Toronto, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993, 
p. 171. 
48. K.V.W. STONE, "'Flexibilization’, Globalization, and Privatization : Three Challenges to 
Labour Rights in our Time”, (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 77. 
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days of “Québec Inc”—of activist government, corporatism and social 
dialogue—may be numbered, However, this ideological shift will not likely 
weaken the strong sentiment of Québecers favouring control of their own 
social and labour policies, whatever those polices may be. Nor, given the 
always-delicate politics of Canadian federalism, is anyone outside Québec 
likely to challenge that sentiment by attempting to revisit the constitutional 
premises on which provincial authority over labour and social policy is 
based49 
For all of these reasons, the current distribution of authority over 
labour market and industrial relations policies within Canada’s federal 
system—however detached from contemporary labour market realities—is 
unlikely to change any time soon. This is a fact of special significance in 
the context of Canada’s increasing integration into regional, hemispheric 
and global economic regimes. 
2.2 Constitutional Jurisdiction over Labour in Light of Globalization 
and Regional and Hemispheric Integration 
In the 1937 Labour Conveniions case50, Canada’s highest appellate 
court (then the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the UK) held 
that neither the federal government’s general powers to legislate for Cana-
da’s “peace, order and good government”, nor its implied power to make 
treaties, nor its power to regulate interprovincial and international trade 
and commerce, authorized it to enact legislation implementing international 
treaties or conventions on matters otherwise within provincial jurisdic-
tion51. Thus, although Canada is a member of the ILO and has ratified many 
of its conventions, it may constitutionally enact legislation to implement 
those conventions only with regard to the 10% of the workforce which 
operates under federal jurisdiction. The provinces must legislate if these 
conventions are to be given effect in the rest of the Canadian labour market. 
If, for example, Canada were to agree to a social clause in the WTO dealing 
49. L. BeRNIER, M. BouCHARD & B. LEVESQUE, “Attending to the General Interest: New 
Mechanisms for Mediating between the Individual, Collective and General Interest in 
Québec”, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, vol. 74, n° 3, September 2003, 
p. 321 ; P. GRAEFE, “The Quebec Patronnat : Proposing a Neo-Liberal Political Economy 
after All”, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 41, n° 2, 2004, p. 171 ; 
D. BéLAND & A. LECOURS, “Sub-state nationalism and the welfare state: Québec and 
Canadian federalism"^Nations and Nationalism, vol. 12, n° 1, January 2006, p. 77. 
50. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (Labour 
Conventions Case). 
51. R.L. HOWSE, “The Labour Conventions Doctrine in an Era of Global Interdependence: 
Rethinking the Constitutional Dimensions of Canada’s External Economic Relations”, 
(1990) 16 Canadian Business Law Journal 160. 
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with, say, the right of workers to a “living wage”, that clause would have 
no domestic effect unless provinces chose to enact statutes to give it force. 
And while Canada has in fact negotiated the so-called North American 
Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), under which it obligates 
itself to observe its own labour legislation, the federal government cannot 
require the provinces to observe theirs. Their obligation to comply is trig-
gered only by their accession to the agreement. 
This has created some serious anomalies. For example, for want of 
provincial agreement, Canada’s extensive auto industry is unaffected by 
the NAALC even though production is seamlessly integrated across the 
Canada-US border52. Nor could the federal government coordinate its 
efforts with US federal or state governments with a view to developing joint 
labour market or industrial relations policies either in the auto industry or 
more generally. Likewise, bilateral agreements between Canada and its 
hemispheric trading partners, as well as obligations assumed under inter-
American and international treaties53, are unenforceable insofar as they 
relate to labour market, labour standards or industrial relations issues 
under provincial jurisdiction. So too, presumably, are UN human rights 
conventions bearing on labour issues. 
The consequences are not merely juridical. As a result of federal 
initiatives, the Canadian economy has become deeply integrated into a 
continental economic space dominated by the United States, and into the 
broader hemispheric and global economic systems. Whatever its merits 
might be, this integration has led to the restructuring of many sectors of 
the economy, a significant change in the balance of power between workers 
and employers and a reduction in the ability of workers to assert their rights 
and protect their interests. Because the provinces exercise no constitutional 
authority over tariffs or the making of treaties, however, they are unable 
to influence the content or consequences of trade regimes in ways which 
might protect the interests of their workers. The result overall is a poten-
tially significant disjuncture between trade and economic policy, on the one 
hand, and labour market and industrial relations policy on the other. 
52. Annex 46 of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation [hereinafter 
NAALC] specifies that the NAALC comes into force as regards Canada only after 
provinces representing 35 % of the population have acceded to it, and even then, only 
with regard to industries 55% of whose workers reside within those provinces. Since 
Ontario has never acceded, the auto industry - almost entirely located in Ontario - is 
not covered by the NAALC although it is completed integrated on a continental basis. 
53. A. BLACkeTT, “Toward Social Regionalism in the Americas”, (2002) 23 Comparative 
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2.3 Social legislation 
As for social legislation more generally, specific constitutional amend-
ments gave the federal government responsibility for unemployment insur-
ance (1940) and old age pensions and supplementary benefits (1964)54. The 
former provision, moreover, has been used to justify programs of income 
support, such as parental leave, during periods when employment income 
is interrupted, but not (for example) to institute job training schemes to 
reduce the likelihood of unemployment55. 
That said, federal power is both less and more than might appear from 
this bare description of the formal distribution of constitutional power and 
responsibility. On the one hand, recognizing the political dynamic of the 
Canadian federation, the federal government has agreed to allow Québec 
to establish and administer its own pension and employment insurance 
schemes, loosely coordinated with the national scheme56. On the other, the 
Canadian Constitution establishes the shared commitment of the federal 
and provincial governments to “promoting equal opportunities for the well-
being of all Canadians, ... furthering economic development to reduce 
disparity in opportunities, ... and providing essential public services of 
reasonable quality to all Canadians”57. Although only a declaration “in 
principle”, the Constitution also records their agreement to a system of 
“equalization payments” intended “to ensure that provincial governments 
have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public 
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation”58. In practice, this 
means that taxes collected by the federal government from residents of 
the richest provinces are used to subsidize public services for citizens in 
the poorest. 
Apart from equalization payments, the federal government has also 
used its extensive powers to tax and spend in order to forge national frame-
works for the delivery of social programs, notably health care and post-
secondary education. These frameworks take the form of federal-provincial 
agreements which provide that in exchange for a promise by the provinces 
to deliver social programs which adhere to national standards, the federal 
government will contribute a significant proportion of the cost. At various 
54. Constitution Act, 1940, (U.K.), 3-4 Geo. VI, c. 36; Constitution Act, 1964, 12-13 Eliz. II, 
c. 73 (UK). 
55. Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.),ss. 22 and 23, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669. 
56. J. POIRIEr, “Federalism, Social Policy and Competing Visions of the Canadian Social 
Union”, (2002) 13 National Journal of Constitutional Law 355. 
57. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 36(1). 
5ii. Constitution Act, 19oz, s. 36(2). 
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times, similar programs have been developed concerning social housing, 
skills training, immigrant settlement, income support for the poor and other 
programs with direct or indirect effects on the labour market59. 
Enthusiasm for this so-called “fiscal federalism” or “cooperative feder-
alism” waxes and wanes, as the federal government seeks to lower taxes 
and reduce its financial commitments, as provincial governments grow 
restive with national standards, and as provinces ascend and descend the 
league tables of prosperity. However, the system has sustained the Cana-
dian welfare state and held the federation together for several generations. 
It must be reckoned as representing a triumph for political necessity, prag-
matism and good will over constitutional doctrine60. 
2.4 The Judiciary Power 
The structure and powers of the judiciary are potentially of great 
importance in determining the scope and efficacy of labour law. Until quite 
recently, Canadian courts were generally unsympathetic, and often actively 
hostile, to workers and unions. Tort doctrines, such as conspiracy to injure, 
inducing breach of contract and wrongful interference with economic rights 
were developed with the transparent purpose of curbing union power. 
Contract doctrines which made collective agreements unenforceable, 
deprived workers of the right to specific performance of the employment 
bargain and imposed on them implied obligations of faithful service, placed 
them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their employers. And judicial inventions 
such as the labour injunction provided employers with speedy remedies 
while depriving workers of procedural protections. 
For these reasons, the administration of modern labour legislation was 
generally removed from the courts and assigned to non-curial tribunals 
which operated with rules, powers, procedures and personnel appropriate 
to their specialized functions. The relationship of these tribunals to the 
overall legal system has always been somewhat troubled, largely because 
59. D. GUEST, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 3rd ed., Vancouver, University 
of British Columbia Press, 1997; D. LAYCOCk & G. CLARKE, Framing the Canadian 
Social Contract: Integraiing Socia,, Economic and Political Values since 1940, Ottawa, 
Canadian Policy Research Networks, Discussion Paper no. P/02, 2002. 
60. See e.g. P.M. BooTHE, Reforming Fiscal Federaiism for Global Competition a Canada-
Austraiia compaiison, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1996; H. LAZAR (ed.), 
Canada: State of the Federaiion, 1999/2000: Toward a New Mission Statemett for 
Canadian Fiscal Federalism, Kingston : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, McGill 
Queen’s University Press, 2000 ; S. ChoudhRY, “Recasting Social Canada: A Reconside-
ration of Federal Jurisdiction Over Social Policy”, (2002) 52 Universtty of Toronto Law 
Review 163. 
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courts have insisted on reviewing their decisions in order to ensure that they 
comply with the general law of the land and that they adhere to procedures 
which judges can recognize as “fair”. In doing so, unfortunately, reviewing 
courts often adopted perverse interpretations of labour statutes thereby 
frustrating the intent of legislatures which had, after all, established special 
labour tribunals in the first place because judicial attitudes, procedures and 
doctrines were deemed inappropriate for labour disputes. 
The constitutional basis of judicial review has always been somewhat 
obscure. However, for years it was generally understood to rest on the 
principle of ultra vires whereby the legislature is presumed to intend that 
everyone to whom it delegates powers must use them in accordance with 
the governing statute61. Over the years, however, legislatures had sought to 
prevent the application of this principle to labour tribunals by negating this 
presumption, through so-called privative clauses which precluded judges 
from reviewing tribunal decisions. And judges, responding both to the legis-
lative signals and to telling critiques of their decisions, developed habits of 
self-restraint, in the form of doctrines which permitted tribunals to reach 
their own legal interpretations so long as they were “reasonable” and to 
develop their own procedures so long as they did not violate principles of 
fundamental fairness62. Both tendencies were abruptly terminated by three 
almost-simultaneous developments. 
The first was attitudinal. While the advent of the Charter in 1982 did 
not directly affect the jurisdiction or operation of labour tribunals, it did 
signify that courts in general would play a more interventionist role in 
political, economic or social controversies. This shift in the perception of 
the appropriate role of judges seems to have triggered an attitudinal change 
on their part, leading them to modify or abandon the doctrines which they 
had only recently adopted to justify their new posture of self-restraint with 
regard to labour tribunal decisions63. 
The second was doctrinal. In a series of startling decisions interpreting 
the judiciary power under Canada’s Constitution, judges began to award 
themselves constitutional powers and perquisites they had never previ-
ously been understood to enjoy64. Particularly material was the Supreme 
61. H.W. ARTHURS, “Rethinking Administrative Law : A Slightly Dicey Business”, (1979) 17 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1. 
62. M.-H. BLAIS et al., Standards of Review of Federal Administrative Tribunals, Toronto, 
Butterworths, 2005 ; B.A. LANGILLE, “Judicial Review, Judicial Revisionism and Judicial 
Responsibility”, (1986) 17 R.G.D. 169. 
63. J.M. EVANS, “Jurisdictional Review in the Supreme Court : Realism, Romance and Reci-
divism”, (1991) 48 Administrative Law Review 255. 
64. I have developed this critique in “Constitutional Courage”, (2003) 49 McGill L.J. 1. 
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Court’s “discovery” in 1982 that the right of courts to review and over-
turn decisions of labour tribunals and other administrative bodies had 
actually been entrenched in the constitution upon its adoption in 186765. 
This belated discovery effectively ended attempts by legislatures to totally 
preclude judicial review, although it left open for debate the minimum 
scope of review which would be permitted. 
The third was jurisdictional and institutional. The Supreme Court 
held in 1995 that Charter claims which arise in the context of a collective 
bargaining relationship must not come directly to the Courts, but must 
be dealt with initially by the appropriate labour tribunal66. Since Charter 
arguments are frequently advanced by the parties, this holding effectively 
requires that tribunal members be legally trained and that the parties be 
represented by counsel. The result is that legal costs are enhanced, that 
proceedings are more likely to be adversarial and protracted, and that the 
probability of review proceedings is greatly increased. The result of this 
new Charter-related litigation is that labour tribunals have lost—probably 
forever—their ability to deal rapidly, informally, knowledgably and effec-
tively with complex and fast-moving employment disputes. 
To recapitulate, because judicial review is slow and costly, it can be 
used to attenuate and ultimately frustrate labour tribunal proceedings, even 
if tribunal decisions are ultimately upheld. Because judicial review gives 
the last word to judges, it puts pressure on tribunal members to adopt 
legalistic interpretations, attitudes, procedures and values rather than those 
grounded in their own expertise in industrial relations. And because in 
these ways judicial review injects courts back into the equation of power, 
it weakens the position of workers who were the intended beneficiaries of 
labour legislation. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The architecture of the Canadian state does not permit the federal 
government to create either national or trans-national regimes of labour 
regulation which are congruent with labour markets and patterns of busi-
ness activity. Thanks to financial and constitutional innovations, the federal 
government has been somewhat more successful in establishing nation-wide 
standards for social legislation, and in ensuring that all Canadians enjoy 
reasonably comparable access to social programs. However, these achieve-
ments are rendered somewhat precarious because of centrifugal forces at 
work within the Canadian federation. Finally, the provinces mostly lack the 
65. Crevier v. Attorney General of Québec, (1982) 127 D.L.R. (3d) 1. 
66. Weber v. Ontario Hydro [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929. 
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financial means to establish their own schemes of social legislation ; they 
are vulnerable to regulatory competition from each other; they have no 
legal capacity to regulate labour and employment relations which extend 
beyond their own borders—as most do; and even within their borders, 
they often cannot regulate effectively because they can neither immunize 
labour tribunals from judicial review nor relieve them of constitutional 
burdens which undermine their capacity to act swiftly and effectively. 
3 Labour and Social Rights under Canada’s “Real Constitution” 
I have tried to show that Canada’s formal constitution—its Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, its federal system, its institutional architec-
ture—affects labour and social law only at the margins, and in unexpected 
and often negative ways. In this concluding section of my essay, I will 
suggest that labour and social rights are largely determined by a different 
constitution—by Canada’s “real constitution”. 
The principal features of the “real constitution” can be deduced from 
a crude but essentially non-controversial account of the actual operation 
of our economy and legal system and of the relationship between them. 
Imagine a downward-sloping socio-economic gradient. At the top of that 
gradient are located Canada’s most affluent people, at the bottom, the least 
affluent. At each level, as one descends the gradient, one would find not 
only fewer people with property or with decent job prospects, but also 
more people with poor health, family dysfunction, low levels of educa-
tion, minimal access to civic amenities and diminished rates of voting or 
community involvement. One would also find at each descending point on 
the gradient an increasing percentage of women, disabled people, recent 
immigrants, aboriginal peoples, and members of racial minorities. And to 
connect this description to our legal system, one would also find that in 
increasing numbers people towards the bottom of the gradient lack knowl-
edge of their rights or the means to secure legal representation ; they expe-
rience higher levels of abuse by public bureaucracies and by landlords, 
retailers and employers ; and of course, they enjoy very limited access to 
even the meagre labour and social rights which the formal constitution 
purports to provide. 
If this is indeed an accurate—if over-simplified—picture of how 
Canada’s economy and legal systems work, it would seem to follow that 
the grundnorm, the fundamental principle, of our “real constitution” is 
pithily captured by a graffito I once read scrawled on a wall in London : “the 
economy is the secret police of our desires”. Entrenched Charter rights, 
statutory entitlements, administrative initiatives to alleviate the effects of 
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poverty, all the terms of the implicit social contract must give way in the 
face of “economic realities”. 
If this is indeed the fundamental principle, as evidence suggests, a 
number of second-order rules can be identified. The first has to do with the 
distribution of legislative power. The current configuration of the Canadian 
federation, it turns out, is highly appropriate to an era of neo-liberalism and 
globalization, especially with regard to responsibility for labour and social 
legislation. The national government has significant capacity to restructure 
the economy through its control over Canada’s external commerce, tariffs 
and other trade-related matters. Restructuring has altered the balance of 
power between workers and employers, to the prejudice of the former. 
However, the national government has no independent capacity to initiate 
labour market legislation which might redress the balance or offer workers 
compensatory social benefits. It does have control over domestic fiscal and 
monetary policies, but because these are especially sensitive to the judg-
ment of markets and investors, they must be exercised with great restraint. 
Likewise existing federal influence over social programs which largely 
derives from its taxing powers : given the tenuous state of the federation, 
this too must be exercised circumspectly. Finally, provincial governments 
may effectively veto international treaties which affect labour markets 
and employment relations, but in a nationally and continentally integrated 
economy and labour market, they largely lack the capacity to protect labour 
and social rights. To sum up the distribution of powers under Canada’s 
“real constitution”, then, they are optimally arranged so that labour and 
social policies remain subordinate to global trade regimes, the values they 
embody and policies propagated to make them effective. 
A second feature of the “real constitution” has to do with institutional 
architecture. Given the silence of the formal constitution on the matter, and 
the subordination of labour law and legislation to economic policy, ultimate 
responsibility for establishing and enforcing labour and social rights is 
vested not in the Minister of Labour but in the Ministers of Finance and 
International Trade or the head of the central bank. Of course, the primacy 
of economic over social ministries is a fact of life in many countries to the 
point where, in some, Labour ministries have simply ceased to exist, and in 
others, they have been largely stripped of their advocacy and policy-making 
functions67. The consequence is that labour and social rights are seen as 
a residual by-product of economic policy rather than as an independent 
good in themselves. 
67. See H.W. ARTHURS, op. cit., note 5. 
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A third example of how the “real constitution” differs from the formal 
constitution has to do with the relationship between the judiciary and the 
other two branches of government. The Canadian constitutional tradition 
emphasizes parliamentary sovereignty, with the executive in turn being 
accountable to parliament. This tradition was obviously modified by the 
requirement that each level of government in any federal system must 
remain within its defined jurisdiction, as interpreted by the courts, and 
by the adoption of the Charter, which gave courts the right to overturn 
legislation which violates the rights and freedoms it guarantees. However, 
a potentially more radical revision of parliamentary sovereignty has been 
accomplished by domestic and trans-national advocates of open markets, 
who emphasize the primacy of the rule of law in preventing “arbitrary” 
interference by the state. In Canada, the Chaoulii decision may turn out 
to be the first of many in which judicial power is used to ensure that social 
goods are provided through the market rather than through government 
programs. In the domain of global trade, the EU, the WTO and NAFTA 
have established tribunals with jurisdiction to hear complaints brought 
by corporations against the social and economic policies of national 
governments. As a result, not only domestic judges but also international 
arbitrators and tribunals are now able to prevent activist legislatures or 
administrations from pursuing labour and social policies that impede the 
free flow of trade or otherwise prejudice business interests. 
However, none of these features of the “real constitution” means that 
labour and social rights have necessarily to be disregarded or diminished. 
Like any conventional constitution, the “real constitution” is likely to be 
characterized by considerable ambiguity, obfuscation and contradiction ; if 
it were not, it could never accommodate change and would soon collapse 
of its own weight. Moreover, like any conventional constitution, the “real 
constitution” establishes the institutions and processes which will manage 
change. These institutions inevitably acquire a degree of autonomy, and 
sometimes produce outcomes that could not have been contemplated when 
they were first established. And finally, as with any conventional constitu-
tion, the “real constitution” has its own justificatory rhetoric, its symbols and 
myths, which it uses to claim and confer legitimacy. Legitimacy, however, 
depends ultimately not on rhetoric or symbols but on performance. If the 
“real constitution” does not deliver on its promises to make life better by 
facilitating the operation of markets, it will cease to command the respect 
and obedience of citizens. It may be possible, then, for labour to assert its 
rights under the “real constitution” by taking advantage of its ambiguities, 
by focussing on where power actually lies and by challenging the state to 
make good on its promises of a better life for all. 
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Finally, in its ambiguities, contradictions and deference to power 
and privilege, the “real constitution” has a lot in common with the British 
constitution which, in 1867, Canada explicitly accepted as the model for 
its own. We ought therefore to remind ourselves of the history of labour 
and social rights in the United Kingdom68. British labour won its rights 
by social, industrial and political struggle, not by constitutional negotia-
tion or litigation. With the onset of neo-liberalism and globalization in the 
1980s, British labour lost its rights in just the same kinds of struggles, not 
by constitutional abridgement or amendment. 
It seems, then, that “real constitutions” are what we make them. If so, 
labour and social rights under Canada’s “real constitution” will not be magi-
cally conjured up by a process of constitutional exegesis. They will be hard 
won, by workers’ struggles on the shop floor and picket line, by political 
and social campaigns, and by clear thinking and effective advocacy. 
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